It Takes A Vision: The Constitutionalization of Equality in Canada by L\u27Heureux-Dube, Claire
It Takes A Vision: The Constitutionalization of
Equality in Canada
The Honorable Claire L'Heureux-Dub6
Combining paid work with motherhood and accommodating the
childbearing needs of working women are ever-increasing imperatives.
That those who bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby
should not be economically or socially disadvantaged seems to
bespeak the obvious. It is only women who bear children; no man can
become pregnant.... it is unfair to impose all of the costs of
pregnancy upon one half of the population.
I. INTRODUCTION
With these ringing words, in 1988 the Supreme Court of Canada
overturned its prior jurisprudence on women's equality rights. The author was
Chief Justice Brian Dickson, a person I consider to have been one of Canada's
great feminists. After all, you know you've made a good deal of progress
toward equality when your male Chief Justice is citing Catharine MacKinnon
on sexual harassment in the workplace!
2
I am a great believer in the positive impact of Canada's constitutional
guarantee of equality, found in section 15 of our Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which guarantees the right to be "equal before and under the
law" and "to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national
or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."3
While the Canadian model cannot and should not simply be transposed into
other contexts, exploring how and why section 15 came into being in Canada
provides valuable insight into the positive effects that constitutionalizing
equality may bring. Specifically, I will outline how and why Canadian women
Former Justice, Supreme Court of Canada. I wish to thank my law clerk Laurie Sargent for her
assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [19891 S.C.R. 1219, 1243-44. All post-1989 decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada are available through the Court's website: http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca.
2. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989]1 S.C.R. 1252, para. 49.
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II [hereinafter Charter].
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contributed to the adoption of section 15 of the Charter, as well as show how
their vision has helped to bring about greater justice for all through a major
transformation of Canadian law.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EQUALITY IN CANADA
But first, a little background. In 1867, Canada became a country.4 We had
a written constitution, but it contained no express guarantee of human rights or
civil liberties. This did not stop five women from going to the courts in 1929 to
ask a rather fundamental question: Are women persons? They needed to know
in order to be appointed to Canada's Senate, among other things. In 1928, the
Supreme Court of Canada said "no", women are not persons.5 In 1929, the
Law Lords of the British Privy Council, then our highest court of appeal,
overturned that decision and held that women were persons, at least within the
meaning of certain sections of the Canadian Constitution.6 Lord Sankey took
care to note, however, that "No doubt in any code where women were
expressly excluded from public office, the problem would present no
difficulty." 7  Clearly, Canadian women were still a long way from a
constitutional right to equality!
The struggle continued, however, and gradually some of the most blatant
limitations on women's rights to work and to own property were removed due
to political pressures. Then, in 1960, Canadians got a Bill of Rights, 8 which
recognized every individual's right to equality before the law and the equal
protection of the law. The Bill of Rights had an important limitation, however:
While it stated that it could invalidate another federal law, it was only an
ordinary law itself, not a constitutional document.
Perhaps for this reason, courts interpreted the equality guarantee narrowly,
as a formal and procedural right rather than a substantive one. In other words,
if like people were treated the same, the treatment would not be subject to
scrutiny on equality grounds, even though differing social groups were not
accorded equal treatment. Thus, to give one of the most infamous examples, in
4. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
5. Reference as to the Meaning ofthe Word "Persons' in Section 24 of the British North America
Act, 1967, [19281 S.C.R. 276, rev'd Edwards v. Canada (A.G.), [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.).
6. Edwards v. Canada (A.G.), [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) [known as the "Persons Case"]. The
judgment was handed down by the British Privy Council on October 18, 1929. For interesting
discussions of this case, see also D. Bright, The Other Woman: Lizzie Cyr and the Origins of the
'Persons Case' 13(2) CAN. J. LAW & SOC'Y. 99 (1998); and K. Lahey, Legal 'Persons' and the Charter
ofRights: Gender, Race and Sexuality in Canada 77(3) CAN. BAR REV. 402 (1998).
7. Edwards, 11930] A.C. at para. 43.
8. S.C. 1960, c. 44 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 1l1). The Bill of Rights equality provision reads:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue
to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, color, religion or sex, the
following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, . ..
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law;...
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the 1979 decision in Bliss v. Canada,9 the Court decided that the denial of
benefits on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination, finding
instead that: "If section 46 treats unemployed pregnant women differently from
other unemployed persons, be they male or female, it is ... because they are
pregnant and not because they are women."' 0 Needless to say, women quickly
realized that the Bill of Rights had not provided them with an effective tool for
achieving greater equality.
At the same time, however, some judges were beginning to take a more
"enlightened" view of women's role in society, particularly in the context of
family law. In 1975, for instance, Justice Laskin, later to become Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, wrote in a dissenting judgment:
No doubt, legislative action may be the better way to lay down policies
and prescribe conditions under which and the extent to which spouses
should share in property acquired by either or both during marriage.
But the better way is not the only way; and if the exercise of a
traditional jurisdiction by the Courts can conduce to equitable sharing,
it should not be withheld merely because [of] difficulties in particular
I1
cases ....
By 1978, his views on the need for a doctrine of equitable sharing upon the
breakdown of marriage had the support of two other Supreme Court judges and
had influenced the other judges to a significant extent.12
Not surprisingly, each of these contradictory trends in Canada's Supreme
Court jurisprudence inspired women to make concerted efforts in the political
sphere to obtain greater recognition of their rights. The time was right: In the
late 1970s, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau opened the door to a process of
constitutional renewal in Canada. Although the initiative was partly to secure
the final and total independence of Canada from Great Britain, the focal point
of the renewal was the proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
As a bit of an aside, I note that the initial drafts of the Charter presented to
the public in 1980 made it clear that the government of the day was using the
framework set out in international human rights conventions as its model,
13
9. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183. See also Canada (A.G.) v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 (holding under the
Bill of Rights that a section of the federal Indian Act that disqualified women from claiming their Indian
status upon marriage to a non-Aboriginal man, but did not similarly disqualify men, was not a violation
of equality in light of the differences between men and women and because it treated all Aboriginal
women the same).
10. Bliss, [1979] 1 S.C.R. at 190.
11. Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423,450-51 (Laskin, J., dissenting).
12. Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436.
13. In international law, the human rights approach has dominated ever since the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (Ill), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article
25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967) guarantees that
all persons are equal before the law and guarantees "equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status." See also Articles 3 and 4, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967); International Convention on
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rather than the civil liberties model found in the American Bill of Rights. 14 As
Madam Justice Rosalie Abella has observed, the key insight of the human
rights approach is that human beings should not only be free from the intrusive
state but should also be treated with dignity and should have the means
necessary for full and equal participation in society. Since human dignity and
equal participation encompass both individual and collective aspects of the
human experience, the human rights approach requires balancing the rights of
individuals, the recognition that historically disadvantaged or minority groups
may need special protection, and the collective social interest. Fundamentally,
the human rights approach requires that society be free from discrimination.1
5
Thus, while the Charter's initial drafters may not have been aware of it,
their selection of the human rights model set the stage for a uniquely Canadian
approach to equality, shaped in large part by women, as well as by advocates
for the disabled and other disadvantaged groups in Canadian society.
At this historic moment, women were more organized than ever before,
with a publicly funded lobby group providing strong leadership in the
constitutional process. 16  With great perseverance, they pursued three key
demands with respect to the draft Charter: first, the language of the equality
guarantee had to be broader than that of the Bill of Rights; second, distinctions
based on sex had to be subject to a stringent review by the courts; and third, the
Charter had to include a general statement of equality between men and
women.
Women were obviously sensitive to the language of the draft provision,
given their experience with the Bill of Rights. They therefore lobbied for the
addition of the words "equal under the law" and "equal benefit of the law" to
the equality guarantee, to ensure that the provision would be more broadly
interpreted than the Bill of Rights had been. 17 Their proposed wording was
accepted and now forms part of section 15(1) of the Charter.
Canadian women were also aware of the struggle by American women to
have the United States Supreme Court accord at least an intermediate level of
the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1980).
CEDAW may be viewed as a more detailed articulation of what constitutes substantive gender equality
and of the steps signatory states must take to achieve it.
14. For a more extensive elaboration of this thesis, see Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, Canadian Justice:
Celebrating Differences and Sharing Problems, 1995 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 5 (1995).
15. See generally Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, A Generation of Human Rights: Looking Back
to the Future, 36 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 597 (1998).
16. On the history of women's participation in constitutional negotiations during this period, see
generally ALEXANDRA DOBROWOLSKY, THE POLITICS OF PRAGMATISM: WOMEN, REPRESENTATION
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CANADA (2000); M. Eberts, Sex-Based Discrimination and the Charter, in
EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 183 (A. Bayefsky & M.
Eberts eds., 1985); SHERENE RAZACK, CANADIAN FEMINISM AND THE LAW (1991).
17. See CANADIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, WOMEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE CONSTITUTION: SUBMISSION ... TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION (1981) 2
C.H.R.R. C/35; Eberts, supra note 16, at 200-04.
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scrutiny to sex-based distinctions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Some
groups therefore sought to have an explicit statement in the Charter
guaranteeing the strictest level of scrutiny for distinctions based on "sex."
Other groups felt that there should be a uniquely Canadian approach to equality
and that the levels of scrutiny approach ought to be avoided. Ultimately, the
United States model was rejected by the government. The very fact that a
debate took place on the issue, however, led to a public record of government
statements favoring a strict test for distinctions on the basis of sex.8
Finally, at the eleventh hour, the Ad Hoc Conference on Women and the
Constitution, a broad-based women's lobby group, secured the inclusion in the
Charter of an overarching equality guarantee to women and men from which
there could be no derogation, either in the name of preserving Canada's
multicultural heritage, or under the government's temporary legislative "opt-
out" from the Charter's application.1 9 This is now section 28 of our Charter,
which reads: "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
As you can see, Canadian women, and particularly women lawyers, had a
significant influence in shaping the discourse surrounding, and the content of,
Canada's constitutional equality guarantees. This constitutes one of the most
unique aspects of the Canadian guarantee, as its origins both are modem and
relatively inclusive.
Just as crucial, however, is the fact that the vision of the women who
negotiated section 15 did not end with the adoption of the Charter in 1982.
Based in part on consultations with their American counterparts, who had much
to share given their long experience with anti-discrimination legislation, these
women understood that they would need to follow up with a multifaceted
"Charter-watching" strategy. Thus, the Women's Legal Education and
Action Fund, or "LEAF," was born.
III. TOWARD SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
The Charter-watching strategy included launching test cases, engaging in
public education campaigns and producing academic texts on equality.2' There
was also a comprehensive audit of federal and provincial legislation to
determine whether it complied with section 15. 22 Above all, however, it was
18. See generally Eberts, supra note 16, at 201-04.
19. For the equality guarantee, see Charter, supra note 3, § 28. For the multiculturalism provision,
see § 27. For the "notwithstanding clause" providing for the possibility of an express legislative
override of a maximum five year duration from most of the fundamental rights and freedoms protected
by the Charter, including section 15, see §33.
20. RAZACK, supra note 16, at 36.
21. Id.,at36-41.
22. CHARTER OF RIGHTS EDUCATIONAL FUND, REPORT ON THE STATUTE AUDIT PROJECT (1985).
It should be noted that at the same time, many governments undertook their own audits, in order to avoid
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understood that the first case heard by the Supreme Court on the issue would be
crucial in determining whether a broader interpretation would be given to
section 15 than had beeen given to the Bill of Rights equality guarantee. For all
of these reasons, many of the same women who led the constitutional
negotiation efforts formed LEAF specifically for the purpose of ensuring that
women's voices would be heard wherever equality issues arose in the courts.
This was an important strategic tactic, particularly since Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia,23 the first section 15 case to come before the
Supreme Court, involved a white, male lawyer from England who argued that
his equality rights had been infringed under the Charter because, as a non-
citizen, he wasn't able to practice law in the province of British Columbia. Not
exactly the ideal test case for women's equality! Nevertheless, LEAF sought
and was granted intervenor status in the appeal, along with a number of other
groups, in order to ensure that the Supreme Court had before it important
reminders of all that was at stake when it decided Andrews.
In Andrews, the Court essentially adopted the purposive approach to
section 15 put forth by LEAF, thereby overturning the decisions of the lower
courts, which had taken a "similarly situated" approach to equality. Both
Justices Bertha Wilson and William McIntyre made it clear in Andrews that
they understood the purpose of section 15 to be the protection and promotion of
what we in Canada call "substantive equality, '24 meaning equality of
opportunity and of result, not just similar treatment for those similarly situated.
They did so based on the link made in section 15 between equality and
discrimination, which led them to find that the Charter's equality provisions
had a "large remedial component" requiring the legislature to take positive
measures to improve the status of disadvantaged groups. Thus, the Court
broadened the scope of the equality guarantee.
Drawing on this approach, the Court has since said that the purpose of the
guarantee is "to protect and promote human dignity,, 25 and has recognized that
at the heart of section 15 lies the promotion "of a society in which all are secure
a flood of litigation once section 15 entered into force in 1985, pursuant to section 33(2) of the Charter.
The Federal government and many provincial governments passed omnibus "Charter compliance"
legislation, which no doubt did avoid a certain amount of litigation. See, e.g., British Columbia's
Charter Rights Amendment Act, 1985 (Bill 33); Alberta's Charter Omnibus Act, (1984 Bill 95) and
Charter Omnibus Act, (1985 Bill 42); Saskatchewan's The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Consequential Amendment Act, (Bill 41 of 1984-85); Nova Scotia's Statute Law Amendment Act, 1985;
Ontario's An Act to Amend certain Ontario Statutes to conform to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, (Bill 7, 1985); New Brunswick's An Act Respecting Compliance of Acts of the
Legislature with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S.N.B. 1984, c. 4; the Federal
Government of Canada's Bill C-27, 1985.
23. [198911 S.C.R. 143.
24. The Court has come to describe its approach to equality analysis with this term. See, e.g., Law
v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 548, at para. 46. For the first use of the term in a Supreme Court
decision, see Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, 786 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., McLachlin, J.,
concurring).
25. Law, [1999] I S.C.R. atparas. 53-54.
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in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration. "
26
Similarly, section 15 has engendered a more sophisticated understanding of
how to analyze equality. Based in part on the language of section 15(2), which
states that the general equality guarantee does not preclude programs to
ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged groups or individuals, the Court has
recognized that differential treatment, particularly in the form of "affirmative
action" programs, may be upheld under the equality guarantee, rather than
viewed as an exception to it.27 Regardless of the nature of the distinction or the
grounds on which it is based, the basic question remains whether it is consistent
with the concept of substantive equality.
28
Finally, instead of resorting to different levels of scrutiny for different
grounds of discrimination, the Court was urged to adopt a contextual analysis
of historical patterns of discrimination to determine whether the challenged
legislative provisions perpetuate negative stereotypes and discrimination,29
either intentionally or by adverse effect. 30  The Court held that an employer's
26. Id. at 528, 548-550 (adopting a passage from Egan v. Canada,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (L'Heureux-
Dubd, J., dissenting)).
27. See Weatherall v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872, at para. 6. The Court doubted that differential
treatment of male and female prisoners was discriminatory, thereby suggesting that it was in fact
consistent with substantive equality. The male appellant had challenged the fact that male prisoners in
penitentiaries were searched and patrolled by female guards, but that female prisoners were supervised
only by members of their own gender. The Court noted the historical, biological, and sociological
differences between men and women, the history of women's disadvantage in society, and the realities
of male violence against women. Because of these factors, cross-gender searches do not have the same
effects on men as they would have on women. See also Lovelace v. Ontario, [20001 1 S.C.R. 950, at
paras. 84-87, 93-108.
28. See, e.g., Law, [19991 1. S.C.R. at paras. 72-73. See also Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia, [1989] 1. S.C.R. 143, at 171.
29. See, e.g., M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. The Court held that the exclusion of same-sex spouses
from family law legislation determining the rights of common law couples after marriage was an
unconstitutional form of differentiation, and therefore discrimination, since it denied the dignity of
same-sex partners primarily on the basis of stereotypical views of the nature of their relationships. See
also Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. The appellants, who were deaf, challenged the
failure of the British Columbia government to provide sign language interpreters as part of its publicly
funded health care system. The Court held that even though the treatment received was formally the
same, it constituted discrimination, since those who were not hearing impaired were provided with all
the services necessary to receive effective medical care, while hearing impaired people, who required
interpreters in order to receive effective treatment, were required to pay for this service, and therefore,
unlike others, did not receive the necessary services to enjoy free medical care. Thus, substantively, the
hearing impaired did not receive equal services from the health care system. See also Vriend v. Alberta,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, in which the Court held that the failure by a province to include sexual orientation
as a ground for discrimination violated the equality guarantee of the Canadian Charter, since it denied
the inherent dignity and worth of homosexuals. While formally the legislation treated everyone the
same, because no one was protected against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, substantive
inequality resulted since the under-inclusiveness of the legislation had a disproportionate impact on
homosexuals.
30. See, e.g., Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 173-74. See also, O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 536, 547, where McIntyre, J. observed for the Court:
The [Human Rights] Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the
obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide
relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained
of which is significant. [emphasis added]
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rule that employees had to work periodically on Friday evenings and on
Saturdays violated, without justification, an employee's right to equality as it
imposed a burden on her (she could only be employed part-time) on the basis of
her religious creed (Seventh-Day Adventist). This approach has been adopted
by the Court with very positive consequences. First, it ensures that when one
equality-seeking group "wins" in court, other disadvantaged groups in society
may build upon the success, since the courts do not apply different levels of
scrutiny.3 1 Second, the contextual approach has begun to inject the experience
of historically marginalized groups into the notoriously disembodied and
acontextual world of law. 32 Indeed, while not all of Canada's past or present
Supreme Court judges would be keen to admit it, I think it is fair to say that the
Court has benefited greatly from the insights of contemporary legal theory,
including feminist legal theory, which remind us that legal issues must be
understood in their social context and that legal rules must be viewed as the
product of historical circumstance as much, if not more, as objective statements
of self-evident truths.
33
IV. PLACING EQUALITY AT THE HEART OF THE LAW
Convincing the courts to adopt a substantive definition of equality in the
abstract is only half the battle, as women and other equality-seekers well know.
To be meaningful and effective, a constitutional equality guarantee must not
only lie at the heart of the law, it must become its very life-blood.34 In Canada,
31. See, e.g., Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (involving discrimination on the "analogous ground"
(as opposed to enumerated ground) of non-citizenship). Andrews was foundational for all equality
challenges to follow, regardless of the grounds on which they were based. The equality analysis in that
decision, as well as in other decisions dealing for example with the equality rights of gays and lesbians,
have contributed to establishing a strong principle of substantive equality that informs all equality rights
cases. See, e.g., Law, [199911 S.C.R. 497 (Court refining its equality analysis by drawing on cases such
as Andrews, M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, and Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513).
32. On the "contextual revolution" which has taken place at the Court over the past 15 years, see
generally Shalin M. Sugunasiri, Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Judicial Analysis
andAccountability 22(l) DAL. L. J. 126 (1999).
33. To give just a few examples, the Court has cited the work of a number of feminist scholars in its
judgments, usually as they were presented by LEAF and other intervenors in their briefs to the Court,
including: CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979) and CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE & LEAH COHEN, THE SECRET OPPRESSION:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 38 (1978), cited in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1252, para. 49, by a unanimous Court; Jennifer Nedelsky, Embodied Diversity and Challenges to
the Law, 42 MCGILL L. J. 91, 107 (1997), cited in R. v. R.D.S., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, para. 42
(L'Heureux-Dubd & McLachlin, JJ., LaForest & Gonthier, JJ., concurring); CATHARINE MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 142-43 (1989), cited in R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
577, 664-65 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., dissenting).
34. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, the normative effects of a constitutional guarantee of
equality may also spill over into non-legal spheres, since the guarantee may affect the expectations of
many citizens about their equality rights and provide a "symbolic catalyst for social justice goals," even
if it does not directly affect their lives. See Mary Jane Mossman, The Charter and Access to Justice in
Canada, in CHARTING THE CONSEQUENCES 271, 273 (David Schneiderman & Kate Sutherland eds.,
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it is clear that despite some setbacks, the efforts of women and other equality-
seeking groups over the past fifteen years have begun to bring about this
necessary transformation in areas such as criminal, family, employment and
tort law. Similarly, Canadian courts have increasingly recognized that all
decisions must be consistent with the philosophy of substantive equality, even
if the parties are not bringing a direct constitutional challenge to the law or state
action in question on the basis of their constitutional equality rights.
35
To give some concrete examples of how the permeation of the law by
equality principles may occur, years of dialogue between Parliament and the
courts recently culminated in the upholding of significant changes to the
manner in which sexual offences are prosecuted. In 1999, our new Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin, writing with Justice lacobucci, upheld legislation
which protects the complainant's therapeutic records from disclosure by the
defense, where the evidence is of marginal or no relevance and could lead the
trier of fact to make impermissible inferences based on stereotypes about
women and discriminatory reasoning. 36 In so finding, the Court balanced the
complainant's rights to dignity, privacy and equality with the accused's right to
a full answer and defense. Similarly, the Court has recognized that the criminal
law must be applied in a manner consistent with equality and therefore that the
justice system must understand women's experience.37
1997). See also J. Fudge, The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities and Limitations to the Use of
Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 485 (1987).
35. The Court has acknowledged that "the section 15(1) guarantee is the broadest of all guarantees.
It applies to and supports all other rights guaranteed by the Charter." Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 185.
See also New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46
(L'Heureux-Dubd, J., concurring).
36. The Supreme Court has now expressly recognized in the area of criminal law that obtaining
disclosure of a complainant's therapeutic records in the course of a sexual assault trial requires
consideration of the complainant's rights to dignity, privacy and equality, as well as the accused's right
to a full answer and defense. R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. The new legislation was based, in large
part, on the parameters set out in dissent in R. v. O'Connor, 11995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 419-22 (L'Heureux-
Dubd, J., dissenting). For comments regarding the need to eliminate the use of myths and stereotypes in
judging sexual assault cases in Canada, including the "twin myths" that "unchaste women were more
likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief," see R v. W.(G.), l1999] 3
S.C.R. 597, para. 29, (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., concurring); R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, paras.
82, 87-97 (L'Heureux-Dub, J., concurring); R. v. Esau, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 777, 814-15 (McLachlin, J.,
dissenting); R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, 670 (Cory, J., concurring); Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at
604, 630 (McLachlin, J., concurring); Id. at 651 (L'Heureux-DubU, J., dissenting in part).
37. See. e.g., R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. Self-defense, as generally interpreted by courts
in the past, mandated the apprehension of immediate danger at the time of the crime. Lavallge modified
this requirement for battered women, so the defense now reflects the fact that those who have
experienced cycles of abuse in the past often know when further abuse will come. The Court allowed
expert testimony to assist juries in understanding the perspective of women who have been battered. We
emphasized that it is unreasonable to expect women who fear for their lives from those who have
battered them to wait until they are directly threatened or attacked again in order to defend themselves.
Lavallie was an important step in making the criminal law more responsive to women's lives and
therefore respectful of their human rights. See also R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (taking into
account women's experience with respect to the harm caused by pornography in upholding a challenge
to Criminal Code obscenity provisions and finding that while the provisions violated freedom of
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In family law, equality principles have continued to inform and strengthen
doctrines of equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage or its
breakdown. 38  Somewhat ironically, however, where direct constitutional
challenges were brought to income tax legislation relating to the taxation of
child care expenses and child support payments, women have not had as much
39success in court. Parliament has since bowed somewhat, however, to
women's demands on this front.4n
In employment law, the equality guarantees provided by anti-
discrimination legislation have proven the most significant means of ensuring
that substantive equality applies even in the absence of direct government
action. Even though the Charter does not itself apply to most workplaces, it has
led to the reinterpretation of this anti-discrimination legislation 41 and has
therefore had an important, if indirect, effect on equality rights in the
employment context.42  Post-Charter decisions of the Supreme Court and of
expression, the prohibition nevertheless accorded with § I of the Charter, which allows for limits on
fundamental rights and freedoms as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society).
38. See, e.g., Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813. Despite the fact that this case was not brought
under section 15 of the Charter, the Court held that equality considerations must inform the
determination of spousal support obligations under the Divorce Act. The Court recognized that in order
to be sensitive to the equality implications of their interpretation of the relevant provision, judges may
need to examine the factual social and economic context in which a particular piece of legislation
operates. In that particular case, focusing on equality enabled the Court to look at the perspective and
experiences of women and children, so as to ensure that the principles governing spousal support took
into account their needs and realities. Moreover, as a result of that case, the concept of substantive
equality became important not only for the area of family law, but also more generally for judicial
methods of fact-finding and analysis. This positive trend has continued in subsequent cases of Peter v.
Beblow, [19931 1 S.C.R. 980, and Willick v. Willick, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670. See also G.(L.) v. B.(G.),
[19951 3 S.C.R. 370; and Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, in which the Supreme Court
recently reiterated that courts must ensure that the amount and duration of spousal support payments
must be equitable, taking into account all of the circumstances of the spouses, including not only any
disadvantages that the dependent spouse may have incurred due to the marriage, but also the supporting
spouse's ability to pay, particularly if the supporting spouse has significant resources available.
39. See Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 (L'Heureux-Dub6 & McLachlin, JJ., dissenting)
(the applicant, a professional woman, was unsuccessful in her challenge to have the Income Tax Act
interpreted such that child care expenses could be deducted as business expenses); R. v. Thibaudeau,
[19951 2 S.C.R. 627 (L'Heureux-Dub6 & McLachlin, JJ., dissenting) (the applicant mother failed in her
challenge to the tax regime governing child support payments). The regime allowed the payor of child
support to deduct support payments from income, while the recipient had to include the payments in
income for tax purposes. For a discussion of the complex interaction between section 15 and tax policy,
see K. Lahey, The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Income Tax Law and
Policy, in CHARTING THE CONSEQUENCES, supra note 34, at 107.
40. Despite its "win" in Thibaudeau, Parliament amended the Income Tax Act in 1997 to eliminate
the deduction formerly available to payors of child support and to end the requirement that the custodial
parent include child support as part of his or her taxable income.
41. First and foremost, since the entry into force of the Charter, courts have recognized that both
national and provincial human rights statutes must be given a large and liberal interpretation given their
"quasi-constitutional" status. See generally Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears
Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
42. After 1985, for example, the Supreme Court reconsidered its pre-Charter decisions under the
Bill of Rights anti-discrimination jurisprudence in light of its post-Charter understanding of substantive
equality. See Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, para. 29 (invoking its decision in
Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143). The Court in Brooks expressly overturned the infamous decision in
Bliss v. Canada (A.G.), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, and held that the express exclusion of pregnant women
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human rights commissions have reminded us, for example, that when sexual
harassment occurs,43  when there is systemic discrimination within a
workplace," or when rules of the workplace have a negative impact on
members of certain groups,45 discrimination has occurred. In addition, the
Supreme Court has recently emphasized the need to ensure that the two streams
of statutory and constitutional human rights jurisprudence are consistent in their
respect for the principle of substantive equality.
46
The principle of substantive equality has also begun to permeate certain
aspects of the common law. The Supreme Court has held that common law
rules must develop "in accordance with 'Charter values,"' including
substantive equality.47 In tort law, the Court has therefore recognized that even
though constitutional rights may not be directly in issue, the principle of
substantive equality requires that the law take into account women's
experiences where they have been ignored or excluded in the course of the
law's development, such as with respect to limitation periods and the specific
problems they cause in relation to the reasonable discovery of childhood sexual
assault. 48 The Court has also recognized the power imbalance which may exist
between a male doctor and his female patient.49
from a private employer's accident and sickness plan constituted a form of sex discrimination under the
Manitoba Human Rights Act.
43. Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252. Sexual harassment was held to constitute
sex discrimination, since it was a practice or attitude which had the effect of limiting the conditions of
employment of, or the employment opportunities available to, employees on the basis of a characteristic
related to gender, regardless of the fact that not all female employees in any given workplace are subject
to harassment. The employer was held liable under the Manitoba Human Rights Act for damages caused
by its employee's acts.
44. Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114. Taking a
purposive approach, the Court upheld a human rights tribunal's jurisdiction to impose an employment
equity program upon an employer as a remedy in a discrimination claim, in order to address problems of
systemic discrimination in the hiring and promotion of a disadvantaged group (in this case, women).
The Court noted that the purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act was to prevent discrimination,
rather than to punish wrongdoing, and therefore that broad remedial powers were consistent with that
purpose.
45. B.C. (Public Service Employee Relations Committee) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3. The
Appellant union alleged that the claimant, a female fire-fighter who had performed her work
satisfactorily for over three years, was improperly dismissed on the basis of her failure to meet a
discriminatory aerobic standard required under a new series of fitness tests adopted by the B.C.
Government. The Court held that under the B.C. Human Rights Code, the minimum fitness standard
had a discriminatory effect on women and could not be justified as a bona fide occupational
requirement, since a lower standard could still provide sufficient protection to the public, while also
having a less discriminatory impact on women. See also O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
536.
46. B.C.G.S.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R. at para. 49.
47. A.M. v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, 172 & 175; R.W.D.S.U.v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986]2
S.C.R. 573, 592-93; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 876-77; Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, para. 121.
48. K.M. v. H.M., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6. The plaintiffs father sexually abused her when she was
between the ages of 8 and 16, but she did not commence an action for damages until she was 28, beyond
the time limit of the relevant limitation period. In interpreting the limitations legislation, the Court
considered social science evidence on the impact of incest on its survivors and noted that because of the
nature of such abuse, incest survivors often repress memories about what occurred, are unaware of the
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V. CONCLUSION
Overall, there is no question that section 15 of the Charter has brought
about a major and ongoing transformation in many areas of Canadian law.
Recognizing that my views are informed by this Canadian experience, in all of
its social, historical and political specificity, I hope nevertheless that this
overview of why women fought to constitutionalize equality and how they
brought it about, may provide some insight as to how such guarantees have the
potential to achieve greater justice for all.
But please do not think me naive: I would be the first to admit that on its
own, a formal constitutional guarantee of equality does not go very far toward
achieving justice. The word "equality" is notoriously indeterminate5 ° and,
depending on the meaning ascribed to it, has the potential to lead to justice or
injustice, inclusion or exclusion, substantive change or maintenance of the
status quo.51  Indeed, this is the very reason Canadian women mobilized to
ensure a rich definitional content of the guarantee prior to its
constitutionalization, and to watch over its interpretation subsequent to 1982.
Moreover, a meaningful statutory, constitutional or international guarantee
of equality requires much more than a good definition. Those who need its
injuries it has caused them, or blame themselves for the events. Our Court held that the limitation period
legislation should be interpreted, in the context of incest cases, so that the time period does not begin to
run until the plaintiff becomes aware of the abuse, the responsibility of the defendant for that abuse, and
the fact that the abuse caused psychological or physical injuries she later experienced. In so doing, the
Court recognized the important role that therapy often plays in coming to this understanding.
49. Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992]2 S.C.R. 226. In that case, our Court dealt with the claim of a drug-
dependent woman whose physician had given her narcotics in exchange for sex. The Court recognized
the imbalance and abuse of power in this relationship, and held that the physician was responsible for
aggravated and punitive damages for the tort of battery (sexual assault), id. at 258 (LaForest, J.;
Gonthier & Cory, JJ., concurring). The physician knew of the plaintiff's dependency on drugs, could
have taken steps to treat her for that dependency, but instead chose to take advantage of it for purposes
of his own gratification. Recognizing that she did not truly consent to the sexual activity was an
affirmation of the fact that the doctor had infringed her human right to substantive equality. The
minority also found a breach of fiduciary duty. (McLachlin & L'Heureux-Dub&, JJ., dissenting). See
also Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 (L'Heureux-Dubd & McLachlin,
JJ.) (holding that the principle whereby the common law must reflect the values found in the Charter
provides a further reason why common law liability for negligence should not be applied to pregnant
women in relation to the unbom); K. Sutherland, The New Equality Paradigm: The Impact of Charter
Equality Principles on Private Law Decisions, in CHARTING THE CONSEQUENCES, supra note 34, at 245.
50. John Schaar, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond, in NOMOS IX: EQUALITY 228 (J. Roland
Pennock & J. W. Chapman eds., 1967). The broad language of constitutional equality guarantees create
the potential for a wide variety of interpretations, and therefore have the potential to do justice or
injustice, to be purely abstract or to permeate every aspect of the law. In Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143,
164, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the importance of choosing carefully among
different conceptions of equality, citing John Schaar's observation that:
Equality is a protean word. It is one of those political symbols - liberty and fratemity are
others - into which [people] have poured the deepest urgings of their heart. Every strongly
held theory or conception of equality is at once a psychology, an ethic, a theory of social
relations, and a vision of the good society.
Schaar, supra.
51. See, e.g., D. Majury, Equality in a Post Modern Time, in CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMAS REVISITED 45 (D. Magnusson & D. Soberman eds., 1997).
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protection must have the means to ensure it is put into practice. For, as one of
America's great female leaders, Eleanor Roosevelt, expressed so eloquently:
Where after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places,
close to home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any
map of the world.... Such are the places where every man, woman or
child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity, without
discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have
52little meaning anywhere .
The deplorable situation of women in Afghanistan today, as well as recent
gross violations of human rights in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and East Timor
demonstrate in the clearest manner possible that all the human rights treaties in
the world, drafted and interpreted to give the most meaningful protections
possible, cannot achieve justice on their own.
There are no easy answers to these problems. I put it to you, however, that
part of the solution is for each of us to envision all possible means of ensuring
that guarantees of equality, whether they be statutory, constitutional or
international, penetrate every aspect of state conduct and, ultimately, of human
behavior. This brings me back to the passage I quoted from Chief Justice Brian
Dickson at the beginning of this paper. My observation that he was one of the
greatest Canadian feminists was made half in jest, half in great seriousness.
For it is only when men as well as women become open to women's experience
and perspectives, that we know that we are well on our way to transforming
attitudes and behavior. In Canada, thanks in large part to the vision and
strategy of women's groups, the constitutionalization of equality has played a
large part in bringing about such a transformation.
Furthermore, the Canadian experience suggests that when women help to
forge and shape the development of constitutional guarantees of equality, these
norms have the potential to provide one of the most powerful means available
for making equality a reality for all. Taking hope and inspiration from this
experience, and from our professional and personal aspirations as jurists, we
must therefore re-dedicate ourselves to the achievement of equality in all
aspects of the law. For it is my firm belief that justice without equality is no
justice at all.
52. Eleanor Roosevelt, Remarks at a Ceremony in the United Nations, March 27, 1958, reprinted in
R. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights Law: Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wisc. L. REv.
171, 178.
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